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Abstract 
Larsén, K. 2008. Economic consequences of collaborative arrangements in the agricultural 
firm. Doctor’s dissertation. 
ISSN 1652-6880, ISBN 978-91-85913-61-9. 
 
This thesis consists of five papers that analyse various aspects of contracts in agriculture. 
Four papers concern collaborative arrangements between farmers. Different types of gains 
from partnerships are analysed, such as gains from risk-sharing and diversification, 
biological effects, cost savings on machinery and labour and improved farm efficiency. 
Also a potential cost of partnerships – the risk of opportunistic behaviour among partners – 
is analysed. The objective of the first paper is to analyse if there are incentives for a 
partnership between a specialised piglet and fattening pig producer (vertical co-ordinated 
integration). Using data for average Swedish pig producers, it is shown that improved 
production results in vertically coordinated production as well as risk reduction create 
incentives for specialised piglet and fattening pig producers to collaborate. The second 
paper analyses the incentives for collaboration between a crop and a dairy farm by applying 
a model of a share contract. This study uses data from two pair of case farms representing 
crop and dairy farms of various sizes. The results suggest that gains from risk sharing, 
diversification, improved crop rotation and machinery- and labour-sharing can be 
substantial in a partnership. Paper IV analyses farmers’ decision to engage in partnership 
arrangements, involving machinery- and labour-sharing with other farmers. A theoretical 
framework is used to illustrate that any incentive to act opportunistically is deterred by 
presence of social norms. The empirical analysis, based on a questionnaire to Swedish 
farmers in combination with FADN-variables, suggests that moral hazard problems are 
perceived to be relatively limited in existing partnerships, which are characterized by a 
considerable a degree of trust and good social relations. In the last paper, the impact of 
machinery- and labour-sharing arrangements on farm efficiency is analysed using the same 
data sources as in Paper IV. The results suggest that average efficiency is greater among the 
partnership farms, compared with the non-partnership farms. Moreover, partnership farms 
with the most extensive collaboration, i.e. that share all machinery, display the highest 
average efficiency scores. One paper deals with farmers’ participation in agri-
environmental payment programs. In that study, farmers’ decision to participate in agri-
environmental payment programs is analysed, as well as the impact of program 
participation on economic performance. It is found that larger farms are more likely to be 
program participants and that program participation has a positive impact on farm 
performance (profitability).  Methodological approaches used in the thesis include 
mathematical programming considering risk, Data Envelopment Analysis and 
econometrics. 
  
Keywords: horizontal integration, agricultural firms, partnerships, machinery- and labour-
sharing, farm performance, moral hazard, social norms, trust, mathematical programming, 
data envelopment analysis, regression analysis    
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U., and Smale, M., Routledge (Taylor and Francis).  
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edited by Kontoleon, A., Pascual, U., and Smale, M. Paper I is reproduced with 
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural firms engage in contractual arrangements with various parties. The 
purpose of collaborative arrangements varies, as does the nature of the contracts. 
Contract forms may be ‘horizontal’ (e.g. contracts between farmers) or ‘vertical’ 
(e.g. contracts between farmers and processors). Examples of contract partners are 
other farmers, employees, processors, landlords and government agencies.  
There is a considerable amount of literature analysing contracts and 
organizational structure in agriculture. In the seminal paper by Stiglitz (1974), the 
principal-agent problem is discussed in the context of sharecropping. 
Organisational structure in agriculture has also been analysed using transaction 
cost approaches (e.g. Allen and Lueck, 1998; 2002; Schmitt, 1991). A brief review 
of contract theory and its applications to agriculture is provided in the following 
sections. There are a number of empirical studies that analyse the impact of farm 
organization on farm performance. For example, several authors compare farm 
productivity of family farms and corporate structures in the Central and East 
European Countries (i.e. Mathijs & Swinnen, 2001; Latruffe et. al, 2005)
1.  
However, little attention has been paid to aspects related to partnership 
arrangements between farmers in the form of, for example, machinery- and 
labour-sharing arrangements. These partnerships are often characterized by partial 
arrangements such joint ownership or mutual exchange of some machinery. With a 
few exceptions (e.g. Nielsen, 1999) and to the best of the author’s knowledge, 
gains attributable to such partnerships have not been analysed in the literature.
2 
Four of the five papers in this thesis focus on issues related to partnerships 
between farmers and aims to fill some gaps in the current state of knowledge.  
Some 60-80% of Swedish farms are nowadays engaged in partnerships covering 
machinery- and labour-sharing with other farms (Lantbruksbarometern
3, 2005; 
own survey, 2006). The partnership arrangements between farmers analysed in 
this thesis include machinery- and labour-sharing arrangements, contracts between 
specialized pig producers (vertically co-integrated production) and the case where 
a dairy farmer and a crop farmer ‘merge’ their farms. Some questions this thesis 
attempts to answer are: what is to be gained from partnership arrangements among 
farmers? How much can capital costs be reduced and/or what is the impact of 
partnerships on farm performance? Are there biological effects of collaborative 
arrangements that can improve the economic performance of an agricultural firm? 
For risk averse farmers, partnership arrangements may promote risk reduction in 
net income by risk sharing and diversification effects. Moreover, the risks 
associated with introducing new technologies can be shared among farmers.   
Another aspect of contracting is the potential problem of opportunistic behavior 
among the partners. This is a central topic in contract literature (especially in the 
                                                 
1 A review of some of these studies is provided in Gorton & Davidova (2004). 
2 There is, of course, an extensive literature on cooperatives in agriculture. However, the 
cooperatives covered in that literature usually takes the form of supply and marketing 
cooperatives, and is thus distinguished from the type of partnerships covered in this thesis.   
3 Lantbruksbarometern is an annual survey conducted by the bank Swedbank (previously 
called Föreningssparbanken) and the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF).   10
principal-agent literature) and arises when at least one input or action is 
unobservable to the other part, which, in turn, creates incentives to ‘shirk’. When 
applying existing theories to collaborative arrangements between farmers it must 
however be considered that these partnerships differ in many ways from other 
types of business contracts. Partnerships are often initiated between farmers who 
know each other: they may be neighbours, friends or relatives. This is likely to act 
as a deterrent to acting opportunistically, as shirking one’s commitments is more 
costly in social terms. The role of social norms and trust is analysed in Paper IV. 
While the present thesis is mainly concerned with aspects related horizontal 
contracts between farmers, one of the papers (Paper III) is concerned with a 
special case of a vertical contract - farmers’ participation in agri-environmental 
programs. This type of contract is generally characterized by information 
asymmetry concerning farmer ‘types’ (adverse selection): when farmers receive 
payments for the provision of agri-environmental services, the principal (the 
regulator) cannot see the farmers’ true costs for providing these services. The 
study aims to analyse determinants of farmers participation in agri-environmental 
programs as well as to analyse the impact on farm performance from program 
participation. 
The outline of this ‘kappa’ is as follows. First, a brief review of contract theory 
is provided. Thereafter, some literature related to contracts in agriculture is 
summarized followed by a review of aspects of contracts considered in the papers. 
The methodological approaches used are then reviewed. Finally, the results and 
findings are summarized, followed by a discussion of the contribution of the 
research and possible fields for future research. 
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2. A brief review of contract theory 
Various theoretical approaches have been suggested in the literature to explain 
different aspects of contracting, e.g. the choice of a particular type of contract or 
ownership structure. In this chapter, a brief review of two established theories – 
the principal-agent theory and the transaction cost theory – is given, followed by a 
summary of the property rights approach suggested by Hart (1995). The review 
focuses on parts of the theories that are relevant for the types of contracts this 
thesis analyses: e.g. team-production in the principal-agent theory, incomplete 
contracts in the transaction cost theory and asset ownership in the property rights 
approach. The purpose is to describe briefly the general background of the 
theories. It should be noted that some of them are not applied to a large extent in 
this thesis (e.g. transaction cost theory and the property rights approach). 
  In the different theories, various aspects of contracting are in focus: asymmetric 
information concerning ‘actions’ and ‘types’ in the principal-agent theory, the 
costs of contracting in the transaction costs theory and residual control rights in 
the property rights approach. Thus, the different theoretical approaches are useful 
for analysing different aspects of contracting. As noted by for example Bogetoft & 
Olesen (2004), there is some overlapping between the theories, as principal-agent 
theory is concerned with a subset of aspects discussed in transaction cost theory. 
 
2.1 Principal-agent theory 
Asymmetric information is commonly present when a contract is to be established 
between two or more parties. The principal-agent theory distinguishes between 
two types of problem caused by information asymmetry between contracting 
parties - moral hazard and adverse selection.  
Moral hazard can be exemplified by a landlord who is unable to observe the 
input choice of a tenant farmer (where the unobservable input is often referred to 
as ‘effort’). The ‘unobservability’ of effort implies that the agent (tenant) does not 
provide the optimal level of effort, from the principal’s (landowner’s) point of 
view. The problem of asymmetric information arises when at least one input is 
unobservable (as the amount of observable input can be specified in the contract). 
Many authors have discussed how optimal incentive schemes can be instituted 
under varied circumstances. Special cases of the principal-agent model have been 
analysed in the literature, including multiple-tasks (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), 
double moral-hazard (Agrawal, 2002) and team production (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Holmstrom, 1982). This thesis examines the latter case - so-called team-
work models - i.e. production with several agents
4. When output is shared among 
several agents in a team and the effort of each is unobservable to the others, there 
exist incentives for an agent to shirk in effort. The reason is that each agent only 
receives a share of the total output but has to pay the full cost for his/her effort, 
implying that the effort level provided by each partner is less than the ‘first-best’ 
                                                 
4 Partnership arrangements among farmers, which four of the five papers in this thesis 
analyses, are characterized by a contract between two or more agents (farmers) rather than a 
principal-agent relationship.     12
effort level (i.e. the effort that maximizes the sum of the agents’ objective 
functions). Various mechanisms that deter opportunistic behaviour have been 
suggested in the literature, e.g. peer pressure and social norms (e.g. Barron & 
Gjerde, 1997) and dynamics (Radner, 1986). The role of social norms in 
partnerships among farms is discussed in Paper IV.  
The second type of problem caused by information asymmetry is the 
unobservability of ‘types’. For example, a manager who hires a new worker may 
not be able to separate highly productive workers from less productive workers. 
This problem was originally discussed by Akerlof (1970) in the case of the market 
for used cars. He showed that unobservability of types (high or low quality cars) 
leads to an inefficient outcome where only the latter are traded. Various factors 
that mitigate the problem of adverse selection have been suggested in the 
literature, including signalling (Spence, 1973), reputation concerning product 
quality (Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984) and warranties (Gal-Or, 2001). Farmers’ 
participation in agri-environmental payment programs (analysed in Paper III) is an 
example of the adverse selection problem, as the principal (the government) does 
not have full information about the agents (farmers) costs of providing 
environmental services.  
 
2.2 Transaction cost theory 
In principal-agent theory, the only contract cost assumed is that related to 
observation of variables (such as monitoring a worker’s effort). Transaction cost 
theory regards implementing and maintaining a contract as costly. The transaction 
cost literature began with the classical work by Coase from 1937, ‘The nature of 
the firm’. Other important works include Coase (1960), Cheung (1969) and 
Williamson (1979). 
It is often impossible to frame a contract that specifies all actions that should be 
carried out by the partners in all conceivable situations. Even if it was practicable, 
it would be very costly. Therefore, contracts are often incomplete. Hart & Moore 
(1988) show that there may be inefficient outcomes when partners renegotiate a 
contract. The reason is that the outcome of the renegotiation will be determined by 
initial bargaining powers of the partners rather than factors such as economic 
efficiency. As a result, when the partners expect the contract to be renegotiated in 
the future, they may not make the ‘first-best’ investments in the initial contract 
(Hart and Moore show that, under certain circumstances, this leads to under-
investment). This problem will appear when the first-best investment is ‘relation-
specific’ (that is, when the investment has a higher value within the partnership 
than if the partners were to separate). Because the partners fear potential hold-up 
problems in the sense of an incomplete contract and a relation-specific investment, 
they may prefer to make investments that are relatively non-specific. 
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2.3 A property rights approach  
Hart (1995) noted that transaction costs theory can not explain why a merger of 
two firms reduces hold-up problems. Nor does the principal-agent theory explain 
what happens when firms merge. In order to address this question, Hart discusses 
the so-called property rights approach to firm ownership. 
As discussed above, contracts are often incomplete as they do not specify all 
actions (such as all usages of an asset) that should be carried out in all conceivable 
situations. The main idea of the property rights approach is that ownership 
structure plays an important role, as the owner of an asset decides on use in a 
situation that is not specified in the contract. This is sometimes referred to as 
‘residual control rights’. These will affect the partners’ incentives to make 
relation-specific investments. For example, a firm that acquires another firm may 
have relatively strong incentives to make relationship-specific investments as it 
receives a larger share of the residual control rights. Conversely, the acquired firm 
has relatively little incentive as it receives a smaller share of the residual control 
rights. 
Hart (1995) furthermore notes that there may be an inefficient outcome if 
residual control rights do not concur with residual income rights. To illustrate this, 
it is useful to divide the asset’s value into two parts: short-term income from using 
the asset and long-term income (change in the asset’s value). The individual who 
has the control rights considers the asset’s long-term value. However, the user of 
an asset (who lacks control rights) has no incentive to consider the long-term 
value. As a result, the user may overuse or misuse the asset. This problem can be 
alleviated by providing the worker with residual income rights. The idea is that an 
agent who owns an asset is likely to maintain it more effectively as he/she 
appreciate the asset’s long-term value (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994). Lamoreaux 
(1998) extends Hart’s ideas by considering that there are differences in firm 
ownership (as a result of employing different organizational forms). 
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3. Some literature on contracts in agriculture 
A brief summary of some of the literature on contracts and organizational structure 
of agriculture is provided in this section followed by a general overview of some 
theoretical and empirical literature related to contracts in agriculture. 
 
3.1 Contracts and organizational structure 
Contracting and organizational structure in agriculture have been devoted 
considerable attention in the literature. This section attempts to summarize some of 
this literature, but more extensive reviews can be found elsewhere (for example in 
Knoeber, 2000).  
  The literature on contacting in agriculture has often aimed to explain the choice 
of a particular contract form, such as rental, wage or share contracts. Many authors 
have focused on risk sharing among the contract partners, and the trade-off 
between risk sharing and incentives (e.g. the seminal work by Stiglitz, 1974). In a 
rental contract, the farmer bears all the risk whereas the landlord bears all the risk 
in a wage contract. In a share contract, the risk is shared between the landlord and 
the tenant. Traditionally, in the landlord – tenant example, the landlord is assumed 
to be risk-neutral whereas the tenant (farmer) is assumed to be risk averse 
(although there are studies assuming that both parties are risk averse). However, 
sharing risk also implies a cost if the farmers ‘effort’ (e.g. managerial ability) is 
unobservable, as the farmer only receives a share of total output but has to pay the 
full cost for his/her own effort. 
  The risk-sharing explanation has however not always been confirmed by 
empirical data. An often mentioned example is Rao (1971) who found that the 
relatively risky tobacco production in India was characterized by rental contracts 
whereas the relatively less risky rice often was sharecropped.  
  There are exceptions from the tradition of emphasizing risk sharing and the 
trade-off between risk sharing and incentives as the primary explanation of 
contract choice, including the work by Allen & Lueck (e.g. 1998; 2002). In fact, 
they develop a framework were they assume risk neutrality of all involved parties 
and thereby avoid having to make assumptions about agents risk preferences. 
Instead, they apply a transaction cost approach and focus on the trade-off between 
benefits and costs when, for example, analysing optimal farm organization. They 
test their predictions using data from North America.  
  Yet another explanation for the choice of a particular contract type provided in 
the literature is that of self-selection (e.g. Hallagan, 1978). Hallagan (1978) 
considers the choice of a particular contract as endogenous and depending on the 
farmer’s managerial ability. If farmers differ in managerial ability, this implies that 
those with relatively high managerial ability will choose rental contracts whereas 
those with relatively low managerial ability will choose wage contracts. Thus, 
farmers with an intermediate ability will chose a share-contract. However, 
Eswaran & Kotwal (1985) argue that the self-selection explanation may be to 
simplistic. They propose a model where both the farmer and the landlord have 
incentives act opportunistically.      16
 
3.1 Summary of some of theoretical and empirical literature 
There is an extensive amount of literature dealing with different types of contracts 
in agriculture, focusing on different aspects and using different theoretical and 
empirical approaches. An attempt is made to summarize some of the empirical and 
theoretical literature related to contracts in agriculture in Table 1.   
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Table 1. Summary of some literature related to contracts in agriculture. 
Author(s)  Core concept  Type of study  Factor(s) considered 
Allen & 
Lueck, 
1998 
Derive and test predictions about 
optimal farm organization and 
extent of farm integration 
 
Transaction costs 
Smith, 
1991 
Explain the dominance of family 
farms in the western economies 
using a transaction cost approach. 
 
Transaction costs 
Deninger, 
1995 
Suggest theoretical reasons and 
provide examples for productivity 
differences between agricultural 
service cooperatives and 
collectives. 
 
Various theoretical 
predictions of farm 
organization 
Bezemer, 
2004 
Develop a framework to analyse 
behaviour of family farms and 
corporate farms in the presence of 
risk. 
 
Risk 
Carter, 
1987 
Model the tradeoffs between risk 
sharing and incentives in 
institutional choice in agriculture. 
 
Trade-off between risk 
sharing and incentives 
Mathijs & 
Swinnen, 
1998 
Optimal farm 
organisation / 
Organizational 
structure in 
agriculture 
Analyse determinants of  
agricultural decollectivization.   
 
Factors that influence 
decollectivization 
Bogetoft & 
Olesen, 
2003 
Multiple 
producers 
Analyse the impact of different 
competitive regimes on the ability 
to provide incentives based on 
noisy information systems. 
 
Multiple producers and 
processors 
Moral hazard 
Adverse selection 
Gorton & 
Davidova, 
2004 
Productivity and 
efficiency  
Reviews studies of productivity 
and efficiency in the CEE 
countries where one of the main 
questions assigned is the impact of 
organizational form (more 
precisely, family farms versus 
cooperative structures). 
 
Productivity and efficiency 
measurement 
Dorward, 
1999 
Develope a conceptual approach 
that relates transaction costs, 
transformation costs and risks to 
the choice of utility-maximising 
contract 
 
Transaction costs  
Risk  
Kaylen et. 
al.,  1989 
Mathematical 
risk 
programming  Analyse agricultural insurance 
contracts using a mathematical 
programming approach. 
 
Risk   19 
4. Aspects of contracts considered  
In section 2 it was discussed that various theoretical approaches are useful for 
analysing different aspects of contracts. The question is then: what aspects of 
contracts are considered in this thesis? As noted by Bogetoft & Olesen (2004), 
papers on contract theory typically focus on only a few (often only one) aspects of 
contracting. Such approach is often necessary in scientific work were effects are 
traced analytically using stylized models (Bogetoft & Olesen, 2004). This is also 
the case in this thesis, i.e. only one or a few aspects of contracts are considered in 
each paper.
5 To answer the question about what aspects of contracts that are 
considered in this thesis, it is meaningful to use the holistic approach to 
contracting discussed by Bogetoft & Olesen (2002; 2004).  
Although the overall goal of a contractual arrangement depends on the involved 
partners and their preferences, it is not unrealistic to assume the overall goal (at 
least from an economic point of view) is to maximize total profits (Bogetoft & 
Olesen, 2004). In order to do this, different concerns must be taken into account. 
Bogetoft & Olesen (2002; 2004) separate between three main concerns in 
contracting, namely: 
•  Coordination; 
•  Motivation and  
•  Transaction costs  
Coordination of production activities and risk is necessary in order to maximize 
total profit and to minimize the cost of risk. Thus, two main aspects of 
coordination can be distinguished: coordination of production and coordination of 
risk. (Bogetoft & Olesen, 2004).  
Motivation is divided into three main aspects: participation,  effort and 
investment (Bogetoft & Olesen, 2004).   
As for transactions costs, four main aspects are distinguished by the authors: 
entering a contract, conflict resolution, monitoring, and influence costs. These are 
not discussed in greater detail here, but the interested reader is referred to Bogetoft 
& Olesen (2004).  
The papers in this thesis consider mainly aspects of the first two concerns, i.e. 
coordination and motivation. A review of the aspects considered in the papers is 
provided in Table 2.
6         
                                                 
5 To avoid any misunderstanding: the contribution of this thesis is largely empirical, not 
theoretical. 
6 The overview considers the three main aspects of contracts discussed by Bogetoft and 
Olesen (2002; 2004), but not all of the aspects within each main group (it only considers 
those that have been discussed/analysed in at least one paper).    
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Table 2. Aspects of contracts considered in this thesis. (IR-const. = Individual Rationality constraint). 
Aspect of contracts     Paper I  Paper II  Paper III  Paper IV  Paper V 
Coordination  Coordination 
of production 
- The  applied 
methodology allows 
for calculation of 
‘optimal levels’ of 
production activities 
to be undertaken by 
the collaborating 
partners.
 †  
- - - 
  Coordination 
of risk 
Risk sharing among  
the partners 
Risk sharing among 
the partners 
- - - 
           
Motivation  Participation  Each party is 
assumed to 
participate in the 
partnership when 
his/her IR const. is 
satisfied. 
Each party is 
assumed to 
participate in the 
partnership when 
his/her IR const. is 
satisfied.
  
It is argued a farmer 
participate in a payment 
program when he/she is 
equally or better off than 
otherwise (i.e. when the  IR 
const. is satisfied).
 †† 
In the theoretical framework 
(based on Allen & Lueck 
1998; 2002), it is assumed 
that each party participates in 
a partnership when his/her IR 
const. is satisfied. 
It is indirectly assumed 
that farmers collaborate 
when they are better off 
than otherwise, i.e. 
when their IR-const. is 
satisfied.
 ††† 
  Effort  - - - 
 
Each partner’s ‘effort’ is 
assumed to be unobservable 
but presence of social norms 
is assumed to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour. 
- 
           
Transaction 
costs 
  -  -  -  The cost of deviating from a 
group norm, discussed and 
formalized in Paper IV, can 
be viewed as a(n) (additional) 
transaction cost.
 †††† 
- 
† This is, however, not the main focus of the study. 
†† Farmers are assumed to be heterogeneous and potential endogeneity in the participation decision is accounted for in the empirical analyzis.  
††† Potential endogeneity in the participation decision is however not accounted for the empirical application. 
†††† It should be noted that largest the contribution of Paper IV (according to the author) is its empirical part and not the modeling of transaction costs.     21 
5. Methodological approaches 
In order to consider and analyse the different aspects of contracts discussed in 
section 4, various methodological approaches have been applied. This section 
provides a brief review of some of the methodological approaches used in the 
papers.  
In Table 3, an overview of the methodological approach(es) used in each paper 
is given. Mathematical programming that considers risk is used in Papers I and II 
and is reviewed in section 3.1. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), also a 
mathematical programming method, is applied in Paper V to obtain measures of 
farm efficiency and is discussed in the following section (3.2). 
Econometric methods are applied in the last three papers and include linear and 
non-linear regression models. The linear models applied include OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) and 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Squares) and the non-linear include 
limited dependent variable models (e.g. Probit and censored and truncated 
regression models) and count data models.
7  
 
Table 3. Overview of methodological approaches used in the papers. 
Methodological approach  Paper 
 I  II III IV V  
Mathematical programming  X  X
†     
Data Envelopment Analysis 
(mathematical programming) 
    X 
Econometrics     X  X  X 
†The application in Paper I is not a typical mathematical programming model in the sense that the 
optimal level of different activities are determined. In this case, the production activities are given 
(piglet and fattening pig production) but a contract curve is derived by varying welfare weights. 
 
5.1 Mathematical programming, risk and utility functions 
Mathematical programming methods are useful for the type of problem where an 
objective function (e.g. profit or utility) is optimized (e.g. maximized) subject to 
one or several constraints (e.g. limitations on resources). Risk was first introduced 
into mathematical programming models by Freund (1956) and can be considered 
by using for example Quadratic or MOTAD programming. A review of these 
methods can be found in for example Hardaker et al. (2004). Utility maximization 
in mathematical programming is discussed by e.g. Lambert & McCarl (1985). 
Patten et al. (1988) discuss so-called Utility-efficient programming (EU). An EU 
problem takes the following general form: 
 
[] (, ) kk X
k
MaxE U p U z r =∑ ,  r varied                         ( 1 )  
 
                                                 
7 There is a considerable amount of articles and text books discussing these methods (to 
mention a few text books: Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2008; Maddala, 1993; Cameron & 
Trivedi, 1998) and they will not be reviewed here.   
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where  [ ] EU is the expected utility, pk is the probability of state k (k=1, …, K), z 
is a vector of net income by state, r is a measure of risk aversion,  (,) Uzr is the 
utility of net income by state at risk aversion r, and x is a vector of activity level. 
Various software programs can be used for the type of problem described above, 
including GAMS (Brooke et al., 1992) and Excel. 
The mathematical programming models used in Papers I and II are special cases 
of the above general maximization problem where the objective function is a 
weighted sum of the two collaborating partners’ utility functions (Petersson & 
Andersson, 1996). The weights can be interpreted as the farmers’ relative 
bargaining power and the core of Pareto efficient contracts is derived by varying 
the welfare weights for different levels of the risk aversion coefficient (see Papers 
I and II for a more detailed description). It may furthermore be noted that the 
application in Paper I is not a typical mathematical programming model, in the 
sense that the objective is not to determine the optimal level of production 
activities. In this application, the production activities are predetermined (piglet 
and fattening pig production) and the contract shares the only decision variables.  
In both studies, the producers are assumed to have CARA (Constant Absolute 
Risk Aversion) utility functions. An appealing feature of its CARA function is the 
applicability in decision analysis (Hardaker et al., 2004). Moreover, Lien & 
Hardaker (2001) found that the choice of utility function had minor impact in an 
application to Norwegian farms. 
 
5.2 Efficiency measurement using DEA 
In Paper V, efficiency (as defined by Farrell, 1957) is used as measure of farm 
performance. An appealing feature of this measure, compared to other 
performance measures, is that it considers all inputs and outputs at the same time 
(Coelli, 1995). Technical efficiency thus reflects a firm’s ability to convert inputs 
into outputs (i.e. it measures the distance to the production frontier). Both 
parametric and non-parametric methods to obtain estimates of technical efficiency 
have been suggested. An advantage of the non-parametric methods is that they do 
not require a functional form of the production function to be specified, whereas a 
disadvantage is that they assume no noise in the data. Parametric methods allow 
for noise, but they require a functional form of the production function to be 
specified. In Paper V, a non-parametric method, Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), originally suggested by Farrell (1957), is applied to obtain technical 
efficiency scores. When using DEA, a piece-wise linear production frontier 
(surface) is determined by the most efficient firms in the sample. The DEA 
efficiency score is thus a relative measure where the firms in the sample form the 
reference group.    23 
DEA efficiency scores can be either output- or input-oriented. An output-
oriented efficiency score provides a measure of how much output can be increased 
for given levels of inputs. Correspondingly, an input-oriented efficiency score 
provides a measure of how much inputs can be reduced for given levels of 
outputs. Input and output oriented measures give identical scores under the 
assumption of CRS. The decision as to which orientation to use should be based 
on information concerning which factors (inputs or outputs) the firm managers 
have most control over (Coelli et al., 2005). In many applications, input and output 
oriented measures give similar results (Coelli et al., 2005). 
The idea of the output-oriented efficiency score, used in Paper V, is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Assume that a firm has two outputs, y1 and y2, and one input, x. A 
production possibility curve for a fixed level of the input x is illustrated in Figure 
1. A firm that is operating at point A is inefficient as it is below the production 
possibility curve. Inefficiency is represented by the distance AB and the efficiency 
score is obtained as  
 
0/ 0 TE A B =                                             (3) 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Output-oriented efficiency score. 
 
The output-oriented DEA efficiency score for firm i is obtained by maximizing (4) 
subject to the constraints in (5). Constraint (6) must hold when VRS (variable 
returns to scale) is imposed.  
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where xi and yi are m×1 and s×1 column vectors with inputs and outputs for firm i,   
X and Y are m×n input and s×n output matrixes representing data for all firms and 
λ is an n×1 vector of constants. The technical efficiency score of firm i is defined 
as 1/ i φ  and lie between zero and one. This optimization problem can be solved in 
various software programs such as Excel, GAMS (Brooke et al., 1992), DEAP 
(Coelli, 1996) and FEAR (Wilson, 2007).  
  When constant returns to scale (CRS) is imposed, each firm is assumed to 
operate at an optimal scale. If a firm does not operate at an optimal scale, the CRS 
efficiency score will be a mix of ‘pure’ technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
(SE). The relation between the CRS efficiency score (TECRS), VRS efficiency 
score (TEVRS) and the scale efficiency is  
 
CRS VRS TE TE SE =×                               (8) 
 
Thus, estimates of scale efficiency can easily be calculated when using DEA 
(these are calculated in Paper V).    
Once the technical efficiency scores have been obtained, it is often of interest to 
‘explain’ the firms’ inefficiency by analysing the impact from various factors 
(often referred to as ‘environmental variables’) on efficiency. When DEA is 
applied, this is often done by regressing the efficiency score on explanatory 
variables using a Tobit model (because the dependent variable can be considered 
as censored). It was recently suggested by Simar & Wilson (2007) that there is an 
unknown form of serial-correlation among DEA efficiency scores that leads to 
invalid inference when using standard methods for inference in the second-stage 
regression. In order to consider this, the authors suggest two bootstrap procedures 
that can be used to perform valid inference. These bootstrap procedures are 
therefore applied in Paper V in addition to the conventionally used Tobit 
regression. 
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6. Data  
6.1 Papers I and II 
Paper I utilizes data for average Swedish pig producers obtained from the database 
‘Agriwise’ available from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. In 
Paper II, data for gross returns and operating costs from two pairs of case farms 
representing crop and dairy farms of various sizes are combined with data from 
the crop management advisory services. Detailed descriptions of the variables can 
be found in Papers I and II.   
 
6.2 Papers III, IV and V 
An overview of the data used in Papers III, IV and V is provided in Figure 1. In all 
three papers, FADN-variables (Farm Accountancy Data Network) are utilized. 
The FADN consists of accountancy data and some variables representing 
characteristics of the farms/farmers (such as farmer’s age, geographic location and 
type of farming). The FADN variables are collected in all member states of the 
European Union and are intended to be representative with respect to various 
types of farming systems, localization and farm size. In Sweden, the variables are 
collected for approximately 1000 farms each year of which about 100 are replaced 
every year. 
In Paper III, the FADN-variables are complemented with information about 
farmers’ participation in agri-environmental programs (e.g. acreage and payments) 
provided by the Swedish Board of Agriculture.  
Questionnaires concerning farmers’ participation in contractual arrangements 
that involve labour- and machinery-sharing are used in Papers IV and V as a 
complement to the FADN-variables. The questionnaire can be found in the 
Appendix. It was sent to 1042 farms in Sweden in the spring of 2006 and the 
response rate amounted to 76.4%. Not all respondents answered all the questions, 
implying that not all observations could be used in the papers. The questionnaire   
was sent to all farms participating in the FADN during at least one of the years 
2001-04.    
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Figure 2. Overview of data used in papers, III, IV and V.   27 
7. Results and findings 
7.1 Paper I  
The objective of Paper I, Optimal share contracts between pig producers, was to 
analyse if there exist incentives for forming a partnership between a specialized 
piglet and fattening pig producer (vertical co-ordinated integration) using a model 
of a share contract arrangement (Petersson & Andersson, 1996).  
Swedish pig producers are subject to uncertainty in prices and an important 
consideration in the analysis is that a partnership arrangement between a piglet and 
a fattening pig producer may serve as a measure to reduce the price risk for both 
categories of producers. Another important factor motivating the development of 
contractual arrangements is that pigs in vertically coordinated production systems, 
where the piglets are age-segregated, display positive health effects (Holmgren & 
Lundeheim 2002). Thus, the theoretical model considers improved production 
results in vertically co-integrated pig production (higher growth rates, improved 
feed conversion efficiency and lower mortality as well as the variances in growth 
rates and prices.    
  In the empirical section of the analysis, data for average piglet and fattening pig 
producers in Sweden that are accessible in the data base Agriwise (SLU) is used. 
The results suggest that the incentives to participate in a partnership increases as 
the levels of risk aversion of the producers’ increases and the potential expected 
utility gains (money metric) amount to about 25% for both categories of 
producers. 
 
7.2 Paper II  
The second paper, Risk, return and incentive aspects on partnerships in 
agriculture, analyses the incentives for a collaborative arrangement between a 
crop and a dairy farm by applying a model of a share contract (Petersson & 
Andersson, 1996). Factors that are considered in the analysis are: 1) crop rotation 
effects, 2) diversification effects, and 3) reduced machinery and labour costs. 
Furthermore, the model considers the fact that forage is assumed to be produced at 
the farm, and implies a greater degree of risk exposure. The data used in the study 
consist of four case farms (two dairy farms and two crop farms). The results 
suggest that potential expected utility gains (money metric) attributable to crop 
rotation and diversification effects amount to 32-50 % for the dairy farms and are 
even higher for the crop farms. When the partnership also includes machinery and 
labour, the prospective gains reveal an even greater potential. In general, potential 
gains increase when the partners are more risk averse irrespectively of the extent 
of collaboration.  
 
7.3 Paper III  
The objective of the third paper, Participation in agri-environmental programs 
and impact on farm performance: an empirical analysis applied to Swedish   28
agriculture, is to analyse the farmers’ decision to participate in agri-environmental 
payment programs as well as the impact on the economic performance of the firm. 
Given an (economically) efficient payment program, farmers are compensated for 
their costs of participating in a program (such as forgone revenues from 
conventional production and maintenance costs). There is, however, a problem of 
asymmetric information, as the principal (the regulator) does not know the agents 
(farmers) costs of providing the environmental services (e.g. Carlsen, 2001). The 
farmer makes a decision as to how many hectares he/she want to devote to the 
production of environmental services and how much land to retain in conventional 
production. If the farmer is, at least partly profit maximizing, the participation 
decision is influenced by forgone revenue from conventional production and costs 
engendered by program participation as well as the magnitude of the program 
payments.   
  The data set consist of FADN-variables for the period 1998-99 that are 
complemented with information concerning farmers’ participation in agri-
environmental programs (provided by the Swedish Board of Agriculture). 
  In the first part of the study, factors that determine farmers’ decision to 
participate in the programs are analysed. Not unexpectedly, larger farms (in terms 
of land) participate to a greater extent. The localisation of the farm also has a 
statistically significant impact on the participation choice.  The impact of program 
participation on economic performance is analysed in the second part of the 
analysis (were economic performance is measured as the rate of return on total 
assets). As expected, the results suggest that program participation has a positive 
impact on farm performance (2.5-8.5% depending on model specification).    
 
7.4 Paper IV  
The objective of Paper IV, Participation, incentives and social norms in 
partnership arrangements among farms in Sweden, is to analyse a farmer’s 
decision to engage in partnership arrangements, involving machinery- and labour-
sharing, with other farmers. The study focuses on the incentive aspects, potential 
moral hazard problems and the role of social norms.  
Common forms of collaboration are mutual exchange of machinery and joint 
ownership of machinery. A potential gain from collaboration is the possibility to 
reduce the costs of capital. Other potential benefits include access to more 
advanced technology and task specialization among the partners. But there are also 
potential costs associated with partnership arrangements among farms. In so-called 
team production, where output is shared and at least one input (such as ‘effort’) is 
unobservable to the other partners, there may be incentives to shirk in effort 
(Holmstrom, 1982). A farmer’s ‘managerial ability’ may be considered as an 
unobservable input that potentially may cause incentives to shirk in a partnership 
arrangement (Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985). In the case when inputs are shared, there 
may be incentives to overuse or misuse assets that are owned jointly (so-called 
asset moral hazard, see for example Hart, 1995). Factors that mitigate the moral 
hazard problem have been discussed in the literature; they include peer pressure 
and social norms (Barron & Gjerde, 1997; Kandel & Lazear, 1992) and dynamics 
(Radner, 1986). Partnerships between farmers are often characterized by personal   29 
relations (friends, neighbours, relatives) and it is conceivable to believe that 
opportunistic behaviour therefore is costly in social terms.     
A theoretical framework developed by Allen & Lueck (1998; 2002) to analyse 
farm organization illustrates the decision to become a partnership as a trade-off 
between the advantages of task specialization and reduced capital costs versus the 
cost of moral hazard. Their framework is extended to also account for the effects 
of social norms among collaborating partners. Moreover, a model of an input-
sharing arrangement is used to analyse the impact of social norms on asset moral 
hazard. In both cases, the presence of social norms implies that incentives to act 
opportunistically are reduced.   
In the empirical part of the analysis, the impact on the perceived effort levels on 
the extent of collaboration (measured as the number of tasks that the partnership 
encompasses) is analysed. The empirical data consists of FADN-variables over the 
period 2001-04 complemented with a survey of the same farmers concerning their 
participation in labour- and machinery-sharing arrangements (see Figure 2). The   
surveyed partnership farmers indicated that they, in general, are satisfied with the 
social environment in the partnerships, which are characterized by a considerable 
degree of trust. Perceived moral hazard problems are found to be relatively 
limited. Regression results suggests that the degree of perceived effort has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the number of tasks that the 
partnership encompasses, and that younger farmers are more likely to collaborate 
with other farmers.    
 
7.5 Paper V  
As discussed in Paper IV, potential benefits from machinery- and labour-sharing 
arrangements between farmers include reduced capital costs and the possibility of 
investing in more advanced technology. Thus, even if capital costs are not reduced 
as a result of the collaboration, better and more advanced technology can lead to 
increased yields, improved quality of the products and/or reductions in labour 
input. Yet another advantage of partnerships is the possibility of obtaining higher 
product prices and paying lower factor prices thanks to coordinated marketing of 
products and purchasing of production factors.   
The objective of Paper V, The effect of machinery- and labour-sharing 
arrangements on farm efficiency – some results from Sweden, is to analyse the 
effect on farm efficiency of machinery- and labour-sharing arrangements among 
farmers. The data consists of FADN-variables for the period 2001-04 
complemented with a questionnaire to the farmers concerning their participation in 
such arrangements (see Figure 2). The descriptive statistics show that partnership 
farms are, on average, larger than non-partnership farms (both in terms of land and 
in terms of value of total output). It may also be noted that the average capital 
costs are not lower for partnership farms compared to non-partnership farms. The 
organizational form of a machinery- and labour-sharing arrangement vary 
substantially – from informal lending of machinery to sharing all machinery 
equipment. In this study, it is separated between two main organizational forms 
(Org 1 and Org 2). Org 2 denotes farms that share all machinery with one or 
several other farms.    30
  A non-parametric method, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was used to 
obtain estimates of the farms efficiency scores (Farrell, 1957).  For both groups of 
producers, the average efficiency score was found to be higher on average for the 
partnership farms compared to the non-partnership farms (in their own reference 
groups). It was also found that the average efficiency score among the 
collaborating farms is, on average, higher when the organizational form of the 
partnership is more developed. Farms that share all machinery with other farms 
display the highest average efficiency score. Thus, although the partnership farms 
do not face lower capital costs per hectare on average, they display a higher 
efficiency. In addition, when other factors were controlled for, partnership 
arrangements are found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
farm efficiency.  
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8. Conclusions 
8.1 Contribution of thesis 
The main contributions of the thesis are largely empirical. The specific 
contribution of each paper is summarized below. 
In Paper I, it is shown that both biological effects, as a result of improved 
production results in vertically coordinated production, and risk reduction create 
incentives for specialized piglet and fattening pig producers to collaborate. 
Paper II gives important insights into which factors that create incentives for 
crop and dairy farms to collaborate. When the farmers ‘merge’ their firms, they 
have access to a larger set of production activities than is the case when they 
operate independently. Consequently, diversification gains are greater when farms 
collaborate, compared to independent farming. Apart from diversification gains, 
crop rotation effects can be more effectively utilized in a partnership than in 
independent production. This is especially evident in the case where a partnership 
between a dairy and a crop farm is established since the yields of most crops are 
substantially improved when forage is introduced in the rotation. Potential 
expected utility gains and the span of possible (Pareto efficient) contracts from 
improved crop rotation and diversification effects due to risk sharing depend, of 
course, on the farmers’ attitude towards risk. The analysis also considers gains 
from including labour- and machinery-sharing as a part of the collaboration. An 
important contribution of Paper II is the insight that the gains attributable to risk 
sharing, diversification and crop rotation effects can be substantial in a partnership 
between a crop farm and a dairy farm. These gains are even greater when 
machinery- and labour-sharing is included. Thus, Papers I and II provide 
important empirical insights to factors that offer incentives for farms to 
collaborate. 
  Paper III provides insights in to the motives of Swedish farmers’ choice to 
participate in agri-environmental programs. Moreover, the impact of program 
participation on farm performance (profitability) is analysed and the difficulties 
related with the determination of farmers ‘true’ cost of program participation is 
discussed.  
In the literature on contracts, especially in the principal-agent literature, moral 
hazard is suggested to incur a cost in a collaborative arrangement when at least 
one input (such as a farmers managerial ability) is unobservable. In Paper IV, it is 
emphasized that contractual arrangements between farmers differ in many ways 
from other types of business contracts. One important difference is that farmers 
who initiate a partnership often know each and this personal relationship is likely 
to preclude opportunistic behaviour through the presence of social norms. The 
theoretical framework developed by Allen & Lueck (1998; 2002) to analyse farm 
organization was extended to also consider presence social norms. A questionnaire 
sent out to approximately 1000 Swedish farmers suggests that moral hazard 
problems are perceived to be relatively limited in existing partnerships, which are 
characterized by good social relations and high levels of trust. 
The contribution of the last paper in the thesis (Paper V) is to obtain estimates of 
average efficiency gains from machinery- and labour-sharing arrangements, using   32
a sample of Swedish crop and livestock farms. Existing studies that evaluate the 
effects of partnerships have focused mainly on case farms (including Paper II). 
One advantage of using case farms is that the analysis can be performed in much 
greater detail (for example when calculating machinery and labour costs). Despite 
this advantage, an analysis of a larger set of farms enables us to draw more general 
conclusions concerning the economic effects of partnerships (for the analysed 
sample).       
 
8.2 Discussion and fields for future research  
The work process in the present thesis has resulted in several ideas for future 
research in the context of contracts in agriculture, especially concerning contracts 
between farmers. Some of these ideas and are discussed below.    
Much of the literature in contract theory has been devoted to explaining the 
choice of a particular contract or why different contract types co-exist. As 
discussed in section 3, various theoretical approaches have been used to explain 
why a fixed rent, wage or share-cropping contract is chosen in the landlord-tenant 
case. The survey concerning labour- and machinery-sharing arrangements 
revealed that there is a wide variation in the form and organization of existing 
partnerships between farmers – from informal lending to owning all machinery 
jointly and coordinated purchase of production factors (see Table 2 in Paper IV). 
A topic for future research could be to explain the choice of contract type in 
machinery- and labour-sharing-arrangements between farmers (e.g. owning some 
assets jointly, renting or lending assets or ‘merging’)
8. This may be done by, for 
example, using the concepts of ‘residual control rights’ and ‘residual income 
rights’ discussed by Hart (1995). As most partnerships between Swedish farmers 
are characterized by partial arrangements (such as sharing of some machinery) and 
not ‘complete mergers’ between the farms (see Paper IV), it may be meaningful to 
consider the discussion by Lamoreux (1998) of differences in the nature of 
ownership (resulting from different organizational forms) in such an analysis. 
As discussed above, the survey used in Paper IV and V revealed that most 
partnerships between farmers are partial arrangements. This may seem a bit   
surprising as the results in Article V suggest that partnerships farms with the most 
developed organizational form of the partnership (i.e. that share all machinery 
with one or several other farms) are the ones that perform best (this effect is 
especially pronounced for the crop farms). Also the results of Paper II indicate that 
gains in partnerships were the farms ‘merge completely’ can be substantial. At the 
same time, problems with opportunistic behaviour are perceived as relatively 
limited in existing partnerships (Paper IV). So, why are most partnerships between 
farmers characterized by partial arrangements and not by ‘complete mergers’? A 
part of the explanation could be that also partnership farmers want to sustain a 
certain degree of independency.
9 Another reason could be a lack of information of 
the gains attributable to labour- and machinery-sharing arrangements. It could also 
                                                 
8 Allen & Lueck (2002) have partly done this already. They discuss ownership versus 
contracting for the control of assets. 
9 The survey suggested that independency is one of the most important reasons why non-
partnership farms do not collaborate (see Table 6 in Paper IV).   33 
be the case that older farmers do not want to make decisions that will affect their 
children who will take over the farm once they retire. This hypothesis is consistent 
with the finding in Paper IV that younger farmers are more likely to collaborate. 
Moreover, partial arrangements are probably often a first step towards a more 
integrated collaboration. These points are, however, only speculations and the 
‘answer’ to this question is left for future research.   
Another topic for future research is the role of incomplete contracts in 
partnerships between farmers. In the literature on incomplete contracts (e.g. Hart 
& Moore, 1988), it is suggested that incompleteness of contracts, under certain 
circumstances, implies inefficient outcomes such as under-investment. As noted 
by Allen & Lueck (2002), contracts in modern agriculture are often quite simple
10. 
The survey concerning machinery- and labour-sharing arrangements used in the 
present thesis reveal the same pattern; contracts between farmers are not very 
detailed in general (see Table 1A in Paper IV). One explanation for this may be 
that the appreciable degree of trust and good social relations between collaborating 
farmers not only deters opportunistic behaviour (see Paper IV), it may also reduce 
the need to write very detailed contracts as a farmer need not fear that his/her 
partner(s) will ‘hold it up’. Another part of the explanation may be that many 
machinery- and labour-sharing arrangements among farmers cover relatively non-
specific investments. As discussed in section 2.3, hold-up problems only occur if 
investments are relation-specific.  
  An advantage of partnerships where the farms coordinate their purchase of 
production factors and/or marketing of products is that they are able to receive 
more beneficial prices. This aspect was discussed in Paper V, but a more detailed 
analysis of the gains attributable to this factor may be warranted.  
  In the same paper, it was argued that a farmer’s choice of entering into a 
partnership arrangement may not be exogenous. A field for future research is thus 
to test and account for potential endogeneity in the participation choice when 
analysing the impact of collaborative arrangements on farm performance.    
Yet another aspect of contracting not covered in this thesis is the impact on 
financial structure. A partnership arrangement between two or more farms may 
affect their capital structure, as one potential benefit being the reduction of capital 
costs due to its more intensive use. Reduced capital costs will improve the cost 
and profit structures of the farms, but may also have an impact on their financial 
structure. 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that they refer to crop-sharing and cash rent contracts between tenants 
and landlords.   35 
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